Fondness, hostility, co-existence, interdependence? – on political relations between the United States and Cuba
In his day, Fidel Castro was fond of referring to the American constitution, and the Cuban Revolution would find followers among the American people. Kennedy initially wanted “a peaceful revolution” but then he endorsed attempts of overthrowing the Cuban government.
We talk with dr Krzysztof Siwek from the UWr Historical Institute, author of the book entitled “The Political Coexistence of the United States with Cuba, 1961-1975”, published by Routledge, about the dynamics of the conflict between the United States and Cuba during the Cold War.
Ewelina Kośmider: What are the sources of Cuban anti-Americanism? When Cuba was fighting for its independence from Spain at the end of the 19th century, the United States seemed to be its ally, they participated in the war against Spain.
Dr Krzysztof Siwek: Anti-Americanism in the Caribbean and Latin America is directly connected to the beginning of the relationship with the United States and quite a specific form of American interference in the Western hemisphere’s matters. Let me just note Monroe’s doctrine from the beginning of the 19th century, which originally was supposed to nominally protect the Western hemisphere from colonialism and European imperialism, but, in the following decades, it transformed into a de facto tool of American hegemony over South American republics. Pursuing this policy, the United States would often employ a very condescending language, claiming that they acted in the interest of securing independence or rights of nations and countries that emerged after the fall of the Spanish Empire, as in the case of Cuba. Obviously, there were hidden intentions related to maintaining political and economic power, because the United States made use of economic tools as afficiently as of military and diplomatic ones. The United States’ hegemony and the fact that they joined the war for Cuba’s independence was, on the one hand, remembered in the country as a significant, positive contribution, but a critical, oppositional reaction towards the U.S. arose from the same source almost immediately. However, it is also worth naming one significant figure related to the Cuban national liberation movement.
Do you mean José Martí?
Yes, José Martí was someone more than just a poet. He was a spiritual leader of the Cuban War of Independence. Almost from the very beginning of the United States’ involvement in the war with Spain, he voiced his concerns about the future consequences of the American contribution. Fidel Castro, not without reason, would often refer to José Martí’s legacy as a kind of political continuation of his vision of independent Latin America. He wanted to be the executor of Martí’s unwritten will, but in the milieu of the 20th century.
What was the reason for Cuba’s eventual movement towards communism?
During the Cold War, communism was becoming a reason for concern for Cubans and the Cuban political class on the one hand, but, on the other hand, for the Cuban middle class, which was on the rise then, it was a hope to defy the United States’ domination. Ultimately, however, it was not exclusively about the communist ideology, but also about a geopolitical calculation that the nominally socialist Cuba would find footing in the Soviet Union, the United States’ rival. Therefore, it was quite a logical way of overcoming the American hegemony, protectionism towards Cuba, and American economic domination on the island. This is also why people looked for inspiration not so much in communism itself, as in socially radical and subversive political powers promising a change of political and economic systems and breaking that dependence on North America, which was regarded as harmful to Cubans. After the Second World War, such potential was seen in the communist Eastern Bloc, but Fidel Castro’s (who originally considered himself primarily a nationalist) road to collaboration with the USSR was difficult from the start and full of feuds and ideological fractures in later stages. One more interesting thread related to the period before the Second World War, which I mentioned in the book, is that organisations of a radical nature, related not only to communism, would emerge back then. We very often forget that non-communist radicals in Cuba were inspired by or were in touch with fascistic movements from Southern Europe, primarily from Spain, which was the closest culture-wise to Cubans. Nota bene, general Franco often tried to arbitrate in the Cuba-U.S. conflict in the 1960s. Therefore, not only communism, but everything that promised subversion of the economic, social, and political order caught interest of the social groups in Cuba which hoped for improving socioeconomic conditions and lessening the United States’ domination.
A change came at the end of the 1950s in the shape of the Cuban Revolution. Fidel Castro took power.
It’s worth saying that the United States were not hostile towards him at the very beginning. On the contrary, a great relief was felt in Washington after the fall of Fulgencio Batista’s regime because the United States had been hoping to improve their image in the world as an anti-colonial, anti-imperialistic country. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the U.S. competed in this matter with another world power, which was the Soviet Union at that time, and partly with communist China as well. These countries also promised emancipation, liberation, social revolution. The United States, often accused of supporting dictatorships (in fact, it was not only in that time), felt obliged to be a proponent of a positive change in the shape of “a peaceful revolution,” as it was later called by President Kennedy. Americans were convinced that it could be achieved in a liberal-democratic way of heading towards building an economy based on the market, competition, but also social justice. Anyway, it was one of the principal ideological foundations of Alliance for Progress, Kennedy’s administration’s initiative.
Some American left-wing politicians, historians, and sociologists, but also a part of the American public sympathised with Fidel Castro’s revolution at the beginning?
Of course. This part is so interesting because in 1959, before relations between the U.S. and Cuba became more strained, Fidel Castro was fond of referring to the American Founding Fathers, Abraham Lincoln, and the Constitution of the United States as a model for his own nation, a constitutional ideal of political and social order. Back then, Castro still firmly kept his distance from socialism and communism. Moreover, President Kennedy’s advisors in the 1960s commented: “our nation has been built by revolution and Cubans are building their future with revolution. As the proponents of progress, what right do we have to oppose the Cuban revolutionists, who are promoting progress, democracy, and self-determination, not unlike we are?”
Since Castro took power in 1959, up until the start of Kennedy’s presidency in 1961, the American administration watched Cuba. It was not until after 1961 that a tighter policy was implemented regarding the island as per Kennedy’s decision. It is said, and you have said it in the book, that such an attitude was a mistake.
Both sides, Cuba and America, can be blamed for having committed mistakes. Let us not forget that it was not just the United States that watched the events in Cuba and Latin America back then. Other political powers around the world, primarily the Soviet Union, did it too. It does not mean that back when Fidel was taking power, Nikita Khrushchev was hoping for something like building an armed-to-the-teeth Soviet aircraft carrier that would wait by the American coast, ready to play the role of “a deterrent” against the U.S. at all times. On the contrary, at that time, the Soviets had a really careful attitude towards the events in Cuba. It was difficult for them to define Fidel Castro’s ideological and political profile. They considered him “a bourgeois revolutionist” but definitely not a communist, all the more so because he did not present himself as a Marxist. There are many statements from that time where he denied any links to communism. His revolution was supposed to be, at least originally, non-communist and national, but at the same time, its message clearly remained anti-American.
How did Cuba get closer to the USSR?
In the situation, where the relations between the United States and Cuba were getting more strained—anyway, this is how Fidel Castro explained it—a downright rational thing to do was to ask the other side of the Cold War conflict for help, so to ask the Soviet Union for help, and that was eagerly, although somewhat hesitantly, used by Soviets. The essential question, that remains unanswered, is: whether it was the new establishment with the Castro brothers at the helm and with Ernesto “Che” Guevara that had been planning such a development that would trigger the United States’ hostile reaction and would justify Cuba’s relations with the USSR and communism from the beginning, or was it a result of an inevitable confrontation that led to an exchange of blows in the relations between Cuba and the U.S.? This is why I present how the dynamics of this conflict developed in my book. Despite the fact that this antagonism looked extremely dangerous, especially in the first years, and that in some circumstances, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, it could have resulted in a worldwide nuclear conflict, the relations between Cuba and the United States maintained a certain element of mutual self-control. This mechanism inhibited a threat of an uncontrolled escalation, which could have led to transforming the Cold War into a Hot War, but, on the other hand, this global dimension of their conflict made it difficult both for Cuba and the United States to reach an understanding.
Kennedy, having watched Cuba, ultimately wanted to overthrow Fidel’s government. The Bay of Pigs Invasion commenced.
Yes, but it resulted in failure, because the United States’ direct involvement in operations in Cuba turned out to be impossible due to image and political respects. There were many factors that contributed to it. First and foremost, the United States was counting on Cubans to rebel against Fidel in the early 1960s. This was the only kind of rebellion on the island that would be possible for Americans to support, as it would have a moral dimension then that would justify a direct American support in the interest of self-determination, emancipation, and liberation from the dictatorial and communist authorities, which were dependent on the USSR. On the other hand, open aggression, that is air strikes and amphibious warfare against Cuba—and the Pentagon was designing plans of this kind at that time—was simply unthinkable due to political reasons, because the island represented resistance of postcolonial nations against imperialism, which Kennedy’s administration absolutely did not want to be associated with. Therefore, the United States’ hands were tied in a way, as they could not engage in more direct and one-way military action.
However, the United States’ hopes for a domestic revolution turned out to be in vain. Operation Mongoose, consisting of, among other things, Americans initiating acts of sabotage in Cuba, failed as well. The next hectic period was the so-called Cuban Missile Crisis, what caused it?
The context of the Crisis itself is very broad, as it includes the global balance of power between the two Blocs and the Soviets’ thoughtful strategy directed against American interests, while Cuba was a mere hot spot in this case. However, if we want to focus solely on the Cuba-U.S. aspect, which is the keynote of my book, it has to be noted that Operation Mongoose and acts of sabotage done by the American intelligence or by Cuban organisations supported by American intelligence services, even though they were often aggressive in nature, they were downright cartoonishly ineffective in fighting the government in Havana and they resulted only in strengthening Fidel Castro’s authority on the island, which provided him grounds to justify even closer relations with Soviets and the Eastern Bloc. Then, he could believably prove to Cubans and to all of Latin America, as well as to his potential allies from the Non-Aligned Movement, that the United States were not actually an anti-colonial power, but an imperialistic one. By fighting communism, the U.S., in effect, eliminated national liberation movements, no matter whether they were communist or not, and that could justify Cuba’s turning to Moscow and Beijing. And these were the circumstances of the Cuban Missile Crisis: Soviet nuclear missiles got to the island. Castro explained this agreement with Khrushchev, once again, through defensive, not offensive, purposes. If the primary goal of the United States back then was keeping Castro’s Cuba away from relations with the USSR and granting it a neutral status in the Cold War, as American sources tell us, it was an absolutely unachievable goal, given the American administration’s actions. Their result was supposed to be completely opposite. Unfortunately, it did not reflect positively on the American administration’s judgement, even more so that it was so close to their borders.
But at one point, the USSR actually distanced itself from Cuba, why did it happen?
The distance was a consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Fidel Castro was downright outraged at the conditions of the compromise made between Kennedy and Khrushchev in the autumn of 1962, which caused withdrawal of Soviet nuclear installations from Cuba and lifting of the American blockade of the island, because he believed that the Soviet Union betrayed Cuban interests and weakened Cuba’s deterrent potential by making this compromise. According to Castro, Moscow actually cared only for its own geopolitical goals and relations with the United States and it absolutely was not a genuine ally of Havana, and that is why it could not be taken seriously by national liberation movements in the Third World. In that time, this feud could really harm the global image of the Soviets as a power that fought imperialism and colonialism. It was not a coincidence, because that was when the United States formally attempted for the first time to have a political dialogue with Cuba, wanting to discourage Castro from co-operating with the USSR and establish a form of peaceful co-existence. But the 1960s were also the beginning of a holistic dialogue between the East and the West, an understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the ban of nuclear tests, restriction of the proliferation of atomic weapons, and finally, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a relaxation in the relations between the East and the West. Therefore, Cuba could either join this process of relaxing, but that would consolidate its dependence on the USSR, or try to remain neutral by getting involved with the Non-Aligned Movement, or actively support national liberation movements in the world in spite of Washington and Moscow’s interests. Because Soviets, in view of their strategic goals, did not want any additional disputes with the U.S. caused by Cuban operations in the Third World. This is why Cuba navigated efficiently in the 1960s and 1970s; on the one hand, it did not want to make the conflict with Moscow much worse, because losing the Soviet support would effectively mean dismantling Cuban resistance towards the U.S. But on the other hand, it also could not resign from being an anti-imperialistic and revolutionist country that successfully resisted the United States. Let us not forget that Cubans supported revolutionary movements not only in Latin America but also on fronts of other national liberation wars, e.g. in Africa, already in the 1960s. It was one of the reasons why the American administration tried through covert contacts with Castro’s government, to dismantle this Cuban revolutionary internationalism by giving Fidel a neutral political status that was referred to as “Tito of the Caribbean” by Americans.
This is what I just wanted to ask you: what inspired Cuba to accept the role of the country bringing a beacon of revolution to nations of Latin America and Africa?
Fidel Castro said that Cuba was a small country with a huge foreign policy. Cuban authorities assumed that the only way to stop the United States’ eventual aggression was a global activity, analogous to the American policy, that is creating multiple hot spots in the world, so taking part in various military conflicts and national liberation fights in South America, Africa, and Asia, which would distract the United States. And it actually worked to a certain extent. Indeed, Washington assumed that if Cubans were somewhere, Soviets or Chinese communists could definitely be found there as well (or at least that they were behind Cuban actions), and so, in that case, the United States had to watch the area closely, or even intervene, to prevent communist influences from spreading, in compliance with the so-called domino theory. The United States’ responsiveness to this issue very much restricted the flexibility of the American politics during the Cold War, and the best example of that is indeed the attitude towards Cuba.
This is why the Cuban internationalism went against the parallel internationalism of the United States. The United States, being “the defender of the free world,” strived in the 1960s and later to create an image of the country supporting decolonisation and various non-communist movements aspiring to establish a more democratic and liberal world order. Besides, this is how the United States’ involvement in Indochina and intervention in the Dominican Republic in the mid 1960s was justified, this is also mentioned in my book. This is similar to the way Castro justified his own internationalism, whether it was socialist, communist, or simply Cuban, which was interested in the same areas where Americans were present.
The Cuban internationalism definitely resulted in strengthening of Cuba’s political position compared to the United States. You wrote in your book that since Cuba’s intervention in Angola in 1975, the United States began to respect Cuba more and treat Cuba as a political partner?
This is definitely an overstatement, they treated it more as an accepted opponent or a tolerated antagonist. As I have already mentioned, mid 1970s was a period of relaxation in the relations between the East and the West. Henry Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State at the time, was counting on the improvement in the U.S.-USSR relations to lead to an overall stabilisation, also in the matter of local conflicts, such as the issue of Cuba. However, as the relaxation resulted in the U.S. considering Castro’s government to be an ally of Moscow as an element of the global balance of power, the American administration treated the Cuban intervention in Angola not as a self-willed activity of Cubans, but as a move of a Soviet satellite endangering the freshly achieved balance. This is why the conflict in Angola closed a very important episode of a behind-the-stage dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba in 1975. By the way, phases of American diplomats’ secret contacts with Cuban diplomats took place repeatedly in a cycle in the period described in my book. I have mentioned before that already in the years 1963-1964, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was quite an interesting initial phase of contact between Washington and Havana. Of course, it did not lead to any permanent bilateral agreement, it did, however, establish a kind of procedure of managing tension between the United States and Cuba, which I called “rules of political co-existence” in the book. These rules had been being built since the first years of the conflict between the U.S. and Cuba. Apparently, however, they manifested in the periods of direct contact between Washington and Havana. Americans expected that through this approach Fidel Castro would turn into this “Tito of the Caribbean” and Cuba’s political status would be similar to Yugoslavia’s, but that jarred with the simultaneous expectation of the U.S. that the one to contain Fidel’s anti-Americanism by means of dialogue between the East and the West would be Moscow. Castro, in turn, assumed that if the Cuban “internationalist policy,” as he called it, had not been confrontational towards the United States, Washington would have simply stopped respecting Cuba and would not have accepted this state of controlled antagonism. Moreover, Cuba, as a neutral country, could not have hoped to keep receiving this amount of aid from the Eastern Bloc. And then, without this aid, it would have gone back to being the United States’ “half-colony.” That was the logic of the Cuban political class, especially of Fidel himself and his environment.
Nevertheless, I want to emphasise that I put the Cuban perspective somewhat in the background of my book, as I focused mainly on the American point of view and the United States’ opinion on bilateral and global dimensions of the relations with Cuba. Americans were not interested in what Cubans were doing on their island in terms of home affairs, agricultural reform, and even nationalisation of economy. The biggest reason for unrest was the international status of this country as a proponent of revolutionary internationalism allied with the USSR and, in effect, how the case of Cuba would affect other nations of Latin America and the Third World. Would it challenge the United States’ hegemony and position in the Western hemisphere and maybe even in the whole world? There was a whole set of paradoxes in relations between countries competing over a model of revolution and progress that resulted in the state of permanent antagonism, but at the same time, it stopped war from happening, which is the point I focused the most on in the book. There was ideological and political strife between the United States, as an internationalist power, on one side, and Cuba, which was going in a similar direction but through methods of military revolution and, of course, as an ally of an enemy power of the U.S., on the other side. Ultimately, these were the factors that decided that there was no American invasion in Cuba throughout the Cold War, but on the other hand, they prevented conditions of rebuilding diplomatic relations up until contemporary times. The first sitting president of the United States to visit Cuba since the 1920s was Barack Obama, but it happened in entirely different international circumstances which did not require taking too big of a risk nor many sacrifices from neither side.
What historical sources did you use when writing the book, were there Cuban sources, too?
A critic reviewing the book could ask precisely about Cuban sources; there are none, actually, and there cannot be so far, as access to them is still restricted. However, I have pointed out a crucial fact in my book’s introduction. Now, the principal architect of Cuba’s foreign policy was Fidel Castro, or rather the Castro brothers and their environment. This is why, in terms of Cuban references, public appearances of the Cuban leader and his closest associates constituted the main sources for me. To be honest, I do not anticipate anything sensational if Cuban archives will be opened. Usually, when an institution or a country announces that previously secret or unavailable for various reasons archives will be opened, researchers anticipate grand, Copernican revelations. It has been a rare occurrence recently and I would not anticipate a great breakthrough in this case neither, also because, as it tends to happen in diplomacy, confidential information was not written down, but simply transferred orally. Let us remember that regardless of the process of changes in political systems which was the result of the Cuban Revolution of the Castro brothers and Ernesto Guevara there was not much red tape in the Cuban politics for a long period of time. However, it was much more personalised compared to the United States’ politics. This is why, whereas research of the United States’ foreign policies, which is based on abundant archives, is very much justified, it seems that in the case of Cuba the personalism of mechanisms of establishing policies of this country does not promise a great revelation in Cuban archives.
Thank you for the conversation.
Translated by Jakub Dziubek (student of English Studies at the University of Wrocław) as part of the translation practice.
